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Abstract 
In this paper we study the causal impact of police on crime by looking at what happened 
to crime and police before and after the terror attacks that hit central London in July 
2005. The attacks resulted in a large redeployment of police officers to central London as 
compared to outer London – in fact, police deployment in central London increased by 
over 30 percent in the six weeks following the July 7 bombings, before sharply falling 
back to pre-attack levels. During this time crime fell significantly in central relative to 
outer London. Study of the timing of the crime reductions and their magnitude, the types 
of crime which were more likely to be affected and a series of robustness tests looking at 
possible biases all make us confident that our research approach identifies a causal 
impact of police on crime. The instrumental variable approach we use uncovers an 
elasticity of crime with respect to police of approximately -0.3, so that a 10 percent 
increase in police activity reduces crime by around 3 percent. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism is arguably the single most significant topic of political discussion this 
decade. In response, a small economic literature has begun to investigate the causes and 
impacts of terrorism (see Krueger, 2006, for a summary or Krueger and Maleckova, 
2003, for some empirical work in this area). Terror attacks, or the threat thereof, have 
also been considered in research on one important area of public policy, namely the 
connections between crime and policing.  Some recent studies (such as Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2004 and Klick and Taborrak, 2005) have used terrorism-related events 
to look at the police-crime relationship since terror attacks often induce an increased 
police presence in particular locations. This deployment of additional police can, under 
certain conditions, be used to test whether or not increased police reduce crime.1 
In this paper we also consider the crime-police relationship before and after a 
terror attack, but in a very different context to other studies by looking at the increased 
security presence following the terrorist bombs that hit London in July 2005. Our 
application is a more general one than the other studies in that it covers a large 
metropolitan area following one of the most significant and widely known terror attacks 
of recent years. The scale of the security response in London after these attacks provides 
a good setting to examine the relationship between police and crime.  Moreover, and 
unlike the other studies in this area, we have very good data on police deployment and 
can use these to identify the magnitude of the causal impact of police on crime.2 Thus a 
major strength of this paper is that we are able to offer explicit instrumental variable-
based estimates of the police-crime elasticity – the first since Levitt’s (1997) seminal 
contribution and that of Corman and Mocan (2000). In fact, the sharp discontinuity in 
police deployment that we able to identify using this data means we are able to pin down 
this causal relation between crime and police very precisely . The natural experiment 
that we consider also has some important external validity in the sense that it involves 
                                                 
1  The former paper looks at what happened to crime when intensified police presence occurred around 
religious buildings in Buenos Aires following a terrorist attack, and the latter uses terror alert levels in 
Washington DC to make inferences about the police-crime relationship.  Both are discussed in more detail 
below. 
2  Neither Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) nor Klick and Tabarrok (2005) had access to data on police 
activity. 
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the deployment of a clear “deterrence technology” (that is, more police on the streets) 
rather than a simple measure of expenditures. Arguably, this type of visible increase in 
police deployment is the main type of policy mechanism under discussion in public 
debates about the funding and use of police resources.        
A crucial part of identifying a causal impact in this type of setting is establishing 
the exclusion restriction which shows that terrorist attacks affect crime through the post-
attack increase in police deployment, rather than via other observable and unobservable 
factors correlated with the attack or shock. Again, the police deployment data we use 
makes it possible to distinguish the impact of police on crime from the general impact of 
the terrorist attack. In particular, our research design features two interesting 
discontinuities related to the police intervention. The first is the introduction of the 
geographically-focused police deployment policy in the week of the terrorist attack. This 
immediate period surrounding the introduction of the policy was also characterized by a 
series of correlated observable and unobservable shocks related to the attack. In contrast, 
the second discontinuity associated with the withdrawal of the policy occurred in a very 
different context. In this case, the observable and unobservable shocks associated with 
the attack were still in effect and dissipating gradually. Crucially though, the police 
deployment was discretely “switched off” after a six week period and we observe an 
increase in crime that is exactly timed with this change. Thus, we argue that is difficult 
to attribute this clear change in crime rates to observable and unobservable shocks 
arising from the terrorist attacks. If these types of shocks were significantly affecting 
crime rates then we would expect that effect to continue even as the police deployment 
was being withdrawn. Indeed, an interesting feature of our empirical results is how clear 
and definitively crime seems to respond to a police presence.   
Following similar themes, our research design also allows us to examine how the 
overall impact of the police intervention may have been mitigated by temporal or spatial 
displacement effects. Such effects would occur if criminal behavior changed 
significantly in response to the allocation of police. However, we do not find evidence 
of serious displacement effects at the between London boroughs level that forms the 
main part of our analysis.     
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The use of this strong research design is important since the crime-police relation 
has received a lot of attention over the years, yet remains a problematic area. For 
example, a large literature in criminology casts doubt on the effectiveness of police in 
reducing crime. For example, on the basis of a series of criminological studies from the 
1970s and 1980s, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) state that this work “convinced many 
distinguished scholars that no matter how it is deployed, police presence does not 
deter”.3  Moreover, surveys of empirical research on police and crime (e.g. Cameron, 
1988; Marvell and Moody, 1996; Eck and Maguire, 2000) report that the majority of 
studies fail to find any relationship, with some studies even finding a positive 
association between the two.  This is because most of the existing work faces difficulties 
in attempting to unravel the direction of causation in the relationship between police 
resources and crime.  
However, a small but growing research area does directly address the question of 
causality. Probably the best known paper here is Levitt’s (1997) study of US cities, 
which attempts to resolve endogeneity issue through an instrumental variable strategy 
that uses election years as an instrument for police in a crime equation.  In doing so he 
identifies a negative causal effect running from police to crime, but this work remains 
controversial for a number of reasons: see McCrary’s (2002) comment, which discusses 
some concerns about the data and the approach used in the Levitt paper, and Levitt’s 
(2002) response.  
Some of the other work which attempts to identify a causal impact of police on 
crime adopts a quasi-experimental approach looking at what happens before and after a 
policy or event induced increase in police presence.  The Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2004) paper referred to above shows that motor vehicle thefts fell significantly near the 
main Jewish centre in Buenos Aires where a terrorist attack occurred in July 1994 
compared to the area several blocks away where no extra police were deployed. The 
                                                 
3  Sherman and Weisburd (1995) review some of the conclusions from this work. Gottfriedson and Hirschi 
(1990: 270) state that “no evidence exists that augmentation of police forces or equipment, differential 
police strategies, or differential intensities of surveillance have an effect on crime rates”. Felson (1994:10-
11) contends that patrols constitute “a drop in the bucket” for dense urban areas. Finally, Klockars 
(1984:130) stated that using routine police patrols to fight crime was as sensible as having “firemen patrol 
routinely in fire trucks to fight fire”.     
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later study by Klick and Taborrak (2005) used the case of changing terror alert levels in 
Washington to test for a possible impact of police on crime.   As mentioned above, both 
of these studies adopted a reduced form approach by necessity as they did not possess 
the information on police deployment required to provide instrumental variable 
estimates. 
A final strand of related work considers policy initiatives where particular police 
forces were given more resources to combat crime. Two examples are the Street Crime 
Initiative in England and Wales, studied by Machin and Marie (2004) and the 
Community Oriented Policing Strategies programme in the US, studied by Evans and 
Owens (2007). Both of these studies adopt a treatment-comparison programme 
evaluation approach (where treatment areas received extra resources and control areas 
did not) and find that extra police resources reduced crime. The difficulty with these 
papers is that high crime police force areas were selected to get more resources and so it 
is hard to be confident that the analyses remove all the biases associated with this.  
In contrast, the focus of the current paper is on what happened to criminal 
activity following a large and unanticipated increase in police presence. The scale of the 
change in police deployment that we study is much larger than in any of the other work 
in the crime-police research field. Indeed, results reported below show that police 
activity in central London increased by over 30 percent in the six weeks following the 
July 7 bombings as part of a police deployment policy stylishly titled “Operation 
Theseus” by the authorities. During this time period, crime fell significantly in central 
London relative to outer London. Both the timing of the crime reductions and the types 
of crime that were more affected make us confident that this research approach identifies 
a causal impact of police on crime.  We estimate an elasticity of crime with respect to 
police of approximately -.3, so that a 10 percent increase in police activity reduces crime 
by around 3 percent. Furthermore, we are unable to find any strong evidence of either 
temporal or spatial displacement effects arising from the six-week police intervention.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the 
events of July 2005 and goes over the main modelling and identification issues in the 
paper. We provide a recap of the endogeneity problem in the police-crime relationship 
 5
and discuss the problem of correlated shocks in more detail. An important part of this 
discussion is that it considers insights from the growing economics of terrorism 
literature. In Section 3 we describe the data used and provide some initial descriptive 
analysis.  Section 4 presents the statistical results, and a range of additional empirical 
tests.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Crime, Police and the London Terror Attacks 
The Terror Attacks 
In July 2005 London’s public transport system was subject to two waves of 
terror attacks. The first wave occurred on Thursday 7th July and involved the detonation 
of four bombs. The 32 boroughs of London are shown in Figure 1.  Three of the bombs 
were detonated on London Underground train carriages near the tube stations of Russell 
Square (in the borough of Camden); Liverpool Street (in Tower Hamlets) and Edgware 
Road (in Kensington and Chelsea). A fourth bomb was detonated on a bus in Tavistock 
Square, Bloomsbury (in Camden). The second wave of attacks occurred two weeks later 
on the 21st July and consisted of four unsuccessful attempts at detonating bombs on 
trains near the underground stations of Shepherds Bush (Kensington and Chelsea); the 
Oval (Lambeth); Warren Street (Westminster) and on a bus in Bethnal Green (Tower 
Hamlets). Despite the failure of the bombs to explode, this second wave of attacks 
caused much turmoil in London. There was a large manhunt to find the four men who 
escaped after the unsuccessful July 21 attacks and all of them were captured by 29th 
July. As our later descriptive analysis shows, the two sets of attacks were associated 
with an increase in police deployment of approximately 35% in the affected central 
London boroughs in the six weeks following the first attack. 
Crime-Police Endogeneity 
 We use the police response to the terror attacks as a means of identifying the 
impact of police on crime since the weeks following the attacks saw a large, 
unanticipated increase in police presence. Before continuing, it is useful to recall the 
basic endogeneity problem besetting the police-crime relationship. Standard economic 
models of criminal participation (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) postulate that crime is a 
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function of opportunities and deterrence. Thus more police should deter crime, 
predicting a negative empirical relationship between the two.  However, there are many 
situations in which the direction of causation seems to run in the opposite direction (e.g. 
when more police are drafted in to high crime areas because crime is high there).4 
 Figure 2 illustrates the problem empirically using data for the police force areas 
of England and Wales.  It shows a regression of the crime rate on police numbers (full-
time equivalents) per 1000 population in the financial year (April to March) of 2005-
2006.  Evidently the cross-sectional relationship is strongly positive. In a regression of 
log(crime) on log(police) across the 42 police force areas the estimated coefficient 
(standard error) on the police variable is .81 (.08), showing a strong positive association 
which is counter-intuitive to the causal negative impact of police on crime predicted by 
the basic economic model of crime.  It is therefore clear that considerable care and 
attention needs to be taken when empirically studying the direction of causation in the 
crime-police relation. 
Terror Attacks, Crime and Correlated Shocks 
 Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) were first to use police allocation policies in 
the wake of terror attacks as a source of variation to circumvent the endogeneity 
problem. Using a July 1994 terrorist attack that targeted the main Jewish institution in 
Buenos Aires, they show that motor vehicle thefts fell significantly in areas where extra 
police were subsequently deployed compared to areas several blocks away which did not 
receive extra protection. The effect they find is large (approximately a 75% reduction in 
thefts relative to their comparison group) but also extremely local with no evidence that 
the police presence reduced crime one or two blocks away from the protected areas. 
Another study by Klick and Tabarrok (2005) uses terror alert levels in Washington DC 
to make inferences about the police-crime relationship. The deployments they consider 
cover a more general area but (as already discussed) are speculative since they are not 
able to quantify them with data on police numbers or hours.  
                                                 
4  For instance, Levitt (1997) puts it in the following way: ‘Higher crime rates are likely to increase the 
marginal productivity of police.  Cities with high crime rates, therefore, may tend to have large police 
forces, even if police reduce crime’ [Levitt, 1997: 270]. 
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 Both of these papers touch on the issue of correlated shocks to observables and 
unobservables. However, in our London example this could be a greater concern since 
the terrorist attacks (four detonated bombs and a further four unsuccessful attempts) 
were a more significant, dislocating event for the city.  Therefore, in thinking about the 
question of correlated shocks, it is helpful to first consider a basic equation in levels that 
describes the determinants of the crime rate in a set of geographical areas (in our case, 
London boroughs) over time: 
jt jt jt j t jk jtC = α + δP + λX + μ + τ + υ + ε  (1) 
where Cjt denotes the crime rate for borough j in period t, Pjt the level of police deployed 
and Xjt is a vector of control variables that could be comprised of observable or 
unobservable elements. The next set of terms are: jμ , a borough level fixed effect; tτ , a 
common time effect (for example, to capture common weather or economic shocks); and 
a final term jkυ  which represents borough-specific seasonal effects with k indexing the 
season (e.g. from 1-12 for monthly or 1-52 for a weekly frequency).5 
 Now consider a seasonally differenced version of equation (1), where the 
dependent variable becomes the change in the area crime rate relative to the rate at the 
same time in the previous year.  This is highly important in crime modelling since crime 
is strongly persistent across areas over time.  In practical terms, this eliminates the 
borough-level fixed effect and the borough-specific seasonality terms, yielding:  
jt j(t-k) jt j(t-k) jt j(t-k) t t-k jt j(t-k)(C - C ) = α + δ(P -P ) + λ(X -X ) + (τ -τ ) + (ε - ε )  (2) 
Note that the τt – τt-k difference term can now be interpreted as the year-on-year change 
in factors that are common across all of the areas. By expressing this equation more 
concisely we can make the correlated shocks issue explicit as follows: 
k jt k jt k jt k t k jtΔ C = α + δΔ P + λΔ X + Δ τ + Δ ε  (3) 
where Δ is a difference operator with k indexing the order of the seasonal differencing.  
Using this framework we can carefully consider how a terrorist attack – which 
we can denote generally as Z - affects the determinants of crime across areas.  Following 
                                                 
5 These types of effects could prevail where seasonal patterns affect different boroughs with varying levels 
of intensity.  For example, the central London boroughs are more exposed to fluctuations due to tourism 
activity and exhibit sharper seasonal patterns with respect to crime.  
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the argument in the papers discussed above, the terror attack Z affects jtP , shifting 
police resources in a way that one can hypothesise is unrelated to crime levels. This 
hypothesis is, of course, a crucial aspect of identification that needs serious 
consideration.  For example, it is possible that Z could affect the elements of jtX  
creating additional channels via which terrorist attacks could influence crime rates.  
 What are these potential impacts or channels? The economics of terrorism 
literature stresses that the impacts of terrorism can be strong, but generally turn out to be 
temporary (OECD, 2002; Bloom, 2007). Economic activity tends to recover and 
normalize itself fairly rapidly, with longer-term structural impacts occurring in 
industries such as insurance and international transport. Of course, a sharp but 
temporary shock would still have ample scope to intervene in our identification strategy 
by affecting crime in a way that is correlated with the police response. In particular, 
three channels demand consideration. First there is the physical dislocation caused by 
the attack. A number of tube stations were closed and many Londoners changed their 
mode of transport after the attacks (e.g. from the tube to buses or bicycles). This would 
have reshaped travel patterns and could have affected the potential supply of victims for 
criminals in some areas. Secondly, the volume of overall economic activity was 
affected. Studies on the aftermath of the attack indicate that both international and 
domestic tourism fell after the attacks, as measured by hotel vacancy rates, visitor 
spending data and counts of domestic day trips (Greater London Authority, 2005). 
Finally, there may be a psychological impact on individuals in terms of their attitudes 
towards risk. As Becker and Rubinstein (2004) outline, this influences observable travel 
decisions as well as more subtle unobservable behaviour. 
 To summarize, we think of these effects as being manifested in three elements of 
the Xjt vector outlined above: 
1 2
jt jt jt jtX = [X , X , θ ]  (4) 
In (4), 1jtX  is a set of exogenous control variables (observable to researchers), that is, 
observable factors such as area-level labour market conditions that change slowly and 
are unlikely to be immediately affected by terrorist attacks (if at all). The second 2jtX  
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vector represents the observable factors that change more quickly and are therefore 
vulnerable to the dislocation caused by terrorist attacks. As discussed above, here we are 
thinking primarily of factors such as travel patterns which could influence the potential 
supply of victims to crime across areas. The final element jtθ  then captures an 
analogous set of unobservable factors that are susceptible to change due to the terrorist 
attack. In the spirit of Becker and Rubinstein’s (2004) discussion, the main factor to 
consider here is fear or how individuals handle the risks associated with terrorism. For 
example, it is plausible that, in the wake of the attacks, commuters in London became 
more vigilant to suspicious activity in the transport system and in public spaces. This 
vigilance would have been focused mainly on potential terrorist activity, but one might 
expect that this type of cautious behaviour could have a spillover onto crime. 
 The implications of these correlated shocks for our identification strategy can 
now be clearly delineated.  For our exclusion restriction to hold it needs to be shown that 
the terrorist attack Z affected the police deployment in a way that can be separately 
identified from Z’s effect on other observable and unobservable factors that can 
influence crime rates. Practically, we show this later in the paper by mapping the timing 
and location of the police deployment shock and comparing it to the profiles of the 
competing observable and unobservable shocks. 
Displacement Effects and the Response of Criminals 
 Another issue that could potentially affect our identification strategy is that of 
crime displacement. Since the police intervention that we consider affected the costs of 
crime across locations and time, it could be expected that criminals would take these 
changes into account and adjust their behavior accordingly. This raises the possibility 
that criminal activity was either diverted into other areas (e.g. the comparison group of 
boroughs) during Operation Theseus or postponed until after the extra police presence 
was withdrawn. The implication then is that simple differences-in-differences estimates 
of the police effect on crime would be upwardly biased if these offsetting displacement 
effects are not taken into account. 
 As Freeman’s (1999) survey notes the work on crime displacement issues in 
economics is still very limited, with the criminological literature on the topic finding 
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only modest effects. However, the recent paper by Jacob, Lefgren and Moretti (2007) 
outlines a dynamic framework for understanding crime displacement. Their main focus 
is temporal displacement. They hypothesize that the rationale for temporal displacement 
will differ across crime types, with property crimes subject to a potential income effect 
(in cases where the value of property is high) and violent crimes subject to effects 
arising from the diminishing marginal utility of violence.6 Jacob et al (2007) are 
relatively silent on spatial displacement but there are some obvious points to make. 
Spatial displacement effects will depend on changes in the relative costs of crime across 
locations as well as the mobility characteristics of criminals, that is, the extent to which 
criminals are able to change their location in response to variations in costs.   
 Following this analysis, we will test for temporal and spatial displacement 
effects as part of our empirical analysis described below. Specifically, we look at 
temporal displacement effects in the weeks following Operation Theseus as well as 
“between London borough” spatial displacement. There are two types of spatial 
displacement relevant to our quasi-experiment. The first is the displacement of crime 
from treatment to comparison boroughs during Operation Theseus, while the second is 
“within-borough” displacement inside treatment boroughs. For example, within-borough 
displacement would take place in cases where one part of a treatment borough was less 
heavily treated than another. Although we are not able to specifically test for these 
within-borough effects using the available data we still discuss the possible biases these 
effects could create below.  
 
3. Data Description and Initial Descriptive Analysis 
Data 
We use daily police reports of crime from the London Metropolitan Police 
Service (LMPS) before and after the July 2005 terrorist attacks. Our crime data cover 
the period from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2005 and are aggregated up from 
ward to borough level and from days to weeks over the two year period. There are 32 
                                                 
6 For example, where a violent crime is committed in a given week it is less likely to occur again in the 
following week. Intuitively, a criminal who “settles a score” in one week derives less utility from 
repeating the crime soon after.   
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London boroughs as shown on the map in Figure 1.7 There are also monthly borough 
level data available over a longer time period that we use for some robustness checks.   
The basic street-level policing of London is carried out by 33 Borough 
Operational Command Units (BOCUs), which operate to the same boundaries as the 32 
London borough councils apart from one BOCU which is dedicated to Heathrow 
Airport. We have been able to put together a weekly panel covering 32 London 
boroughs over two years giving 3,328 observations. Crime rates are calculated on the 
basis of population estimates at borough level, supplied by the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) online database.   
Table 1 (and Appendix Table A1 in more detail) show some summary statistics 
on the crime data.  We split the crimes into two groups that we refer to as ‘susceptible’ 
and ‘non-susceptible’ crimes since there are good reasons to expect potentially different 
effects of an increased police presence on the two.  The susceptible crimes we consider 
are violence against the person, theft and handling, and robbery. The non-susceptible 
crimes are burglary, criminal damage (e.g. vandalism or graffiti) and sexual offences.  
We expect the latter group of crimes to be less affected by the increased deployment 
because they are more prevalent in residential areas or frequently occur at night.  The 
Table shows the breakdown of crime into these different types and the higher crime rate 
in the central London ‘treated’ boroughs.  This difference in crime rates is an issue we 
return to in our empirical specifications below when discussing pre-policy (or more 
precisely, pre-attack) trends.  
The police deployment data are at borough level and were produced under 
special confidential data-sharing agreements with the LMPS. The principal data source 
used is CARM (Computer Aided Resource Management), the police service’s human 
resource management system which records hours worked by individual officers on a 
daily basis. We aggregate to borough-level data on deployment since the CARM data is 
mainly defined at this level. However, the CARM data contain useful information on the 
allocation of hours worked by incident and/or police operation.  While hours worked are 
                                                 
7  The City of London has its own police force and so this small area is excluded from our analysis. 
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available according to officer rank our main hours measure is based on total hours 
worked by all officers in the borough adjusted for this reallocation effect.  
In addition to crime and deployment, we have also obtained weekly data on  tube 
journeys for all stations from Transport for London (TFL). It is daily borough-level data 
aggregated up to weeks based on entries into and exits from tube stations. Finally, we 
also use data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) to provide information on local 
labour market conditions.  
Initial Approach 
Our analysis begins by looking at what happened to police deployment and 
crime before and after the July 2005 terror attacks in London.  To do this we start by 
adopting a differences-in-differences approach, defining a treatment group of boroughs 
in central and inner London where the extra police deployment occurred and comparing 
their crime outcomes to the other, non-treated boroughs. The police hours data we use 
facilitates the development of this approach, with two features standing out. First, the 
data allow us to measure the increase in total hours worked in the period after the 
attacks.  The increase in total hours was accomplished through the increased use of 
overtime shifts across the police service and this policy lasted approximately six weeks. 
Secondly, the police data contain a special resource allocation code denoted as Central 
Aid. This code allows us to identify how police hours worked were geographically 
reallocated over the six-week period. For example, we can identify how hours worked 
by officers stationed in the outer London boroughs were reallocated to public security 
duties in central and inner London. The extra hours were mainly reallocated to the 
boroughs of Westminster, Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, and Tower 
Hamlets, with individual borough allocations being proportional to the number of Tube 
stations in the borough.8 These boroughs either contained the sites of the attacks or 
featured many potential terrorist targets such as transport nodes or significant public 
spaces. Using these two features of the data we are able to define a treatment group 
                                                 
8 We say “mainly reallocated” due to the fact that some mobile patrols crossed into adjacent boroughs and 
because some bordering areas of boroughs were the site of some small deployments. A good case here is 
the southern tip of Hackney borough (between Islington and Tower Hamlets). However, the majority of 
Hackney was not treated by the policy (since this borough is notoriously lacking in Tube station links) so 
we exclude it from the treatment group.       
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comprised of the five named boroughs. A map showing the treatment group is given in 
Figure 1. In most of the descriptive statistics and modelling below we use all other 
boroughs as the comparison group in order to simplify the analysis.   
What did the extra police deployment in the treated boroughs entail? The number 
of mobile police patrols were greatly increased and officers were prominently posted to 
guard major public spaces and transport nodes, particularly tube stations. In areas of 
central London where many stations were located this resulted in a highly visible police 
presence. Table 2 reports the results of a survey of London residents in the aftermath of 
the attacks.  Approximately 70 percent of respondents from inner London attested to a 
higher police presence in the period since the attacks. The lower percentage reported by 
outer London residents also supports the hypothesis of differential deployment across 
areas.9  
Given the high visibility of the deployment we therefore think of it as potentially 
exerting a deterrent effect on public, street-level crimes such as thefts and violent 
assault. We test for this prediction in the later modelling section. As already noted we 
therefore classify crimes according to whether they are more or less susceptible to a 
public deterrence mechanism. 
Basic Differences-in-Differences 
 In Table 3 we compare what happened to police deployment and to total crime 
rates before and after the July 2005 terror attacks in the treatment group boroughs as 
compared to all other boroughs. Police deployment is measured in a similar way to 
crime rates, that is, we normalize police hours worked by the borough population. 
Following the discussion in Section 2 we define the before and after periods in year-on-
year, seasonally adjusted terms. This ensures that we are comparing like-with-like in 
terms of the seasonal effects prevailing at a given time of the year. For example, looking 
at Table 3 the crime rate of 4.03 in panel B represents the treatment group crime rate in 
the period from the 8th of July 2004 until the 19th of August 2004. The post-period or 
“policy on” period then runs from July 7th 2005 until August 18th 2005 with a crime rate 
                                                 
9 It must be remembered that the estimates for outer London are biased upwards by the fact that outer 
London residents commuting into inner London would have witnessed the higher police presence in these 
locations.  
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of 3.59.10  Thus by taking the difference between these “pre” and “post” crime rates we 
are able to derive the year-on-year, seasonally adjusted change in crime rates and police 
hours. These are then differenced across the treatment (T = 1) and comparison (T = 0) 
groups to get the customary differences-in-differences (DiD) estimate. 
 The first panel of Table 3 shows the unconditional DiD estimates for police 
hours. It is clear that the treatment boroughs experienced a very large relative change in 
police deployment. Per capita hours worked increased by 34.6% in the DiD (final row, 
column 3). Arguably, the composition of this relative change is almost as important for 
our experiment as the scale. The relative change was driven by an increase in the 
treatment group (an additional 72.8 hours per capita) with little change in hours worked 
for the comparison group (only 2.2 hours more per capita). This was feasible because of 
the large number of overtime shifts worked. In practice, it means that while there was a 
diversion of police resources from the comparison boroughs to the treatment boroughs 
the former areas were able to keep their levels of police hours constant. Obviously, this 
ceteris paribus feature greatly simplifies our later analysis of displacement effects since 
we do not have to deal with the implications of a zero-sum shift of resources across 
areas. 
 The next panel of Table 3 deals with the crime rates. It shows that crime rates 
fell by 11.1% in the DiD (final row, column 6). Again, this change is driven by a fall in 
treatment group crime rates and a steady crime rate in the comparison group. This is 
encouraging since it is what would be expected from the type of shift we have just seen 
in police deployment.  
 A visual check of weekly crime rates and police deployment is offered in Figure 
3. Here we do two things. First, we normalize crime rates and police hours across the 
treatment and comparison groups by their level in week one of our sample (i.e. January 
2004). This re-scales the levels in both groups so that we can directly compare their 
evolution over time. Secondly, we mark out the attack or “policy-on” period in 2005 
along with the comparison period in the previous year. This reveals a clear, sharp 
discontinuity in police deployment. Police hours worked in the treatment group rise 
                                                 
10 The one day difference in calendar date across years ensures we are comparing the same days of the 
week.  
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immediately after the attack and fall sharply at the end of the six week Operation 
Theseus period.   
 The visual evidence for the crime rate is less decisive because the weekly crime 
rates are clearly more volatile than the police hours data. This is to be expected insofar 
as police hours are largely determined centrally by policy-makers, while crime rates are 
essentially the outcomes of decentralized activity. This volatility does raise the 
possibility that the fall in crime rates seen in the Table 3 DiD estimates may simply be 
due to naturally occurring, short-run time series volatility rather than the result of a 
policy intervention – a classic problem in the literature (Donohue, 1998). After the 
correlated shocks issue this is probably the biggest modelling issue in the paper and we 
deal with it extensively in the next section. 
 
4. Statistical Models of Crime and Police 
 In this section we present our statistical estimates.  We begin with a basic set of 
estimates and then move on to focus on specific issues to do with different crime types, 
timing, correlated shocks and displacement effects. 
Statistical Approach 
 The starting point for the statistical work is a DiD model of crime determination. 
We have borough level weekly data for the two calendar years 2004 and 2005. The 
terror attack variable (Z as discussed above) is specified as an interaction term 
POSTt*Tb, where POST is a dummy variable equal to one in the post-attack period and 
T denotes the treatment boroughs.  
In this setting the basic reduced form seasonally differenced weekly models for 
police deployment and crime (with lower case letters denoting logs) are: 
bt b(t-52) 1 1 t 1 t b 1 bt b(t-52) 1bt 1b(t-52)p - p = α + β POST + δ (POST *T ) + λ (x - x ) + (u - u )  
 
(5) 
 
bt b(t-52) 2 2 t 2 t b 2 bt b(t-52) 2bt 2b(t-52)c - c = α + β POST + δ (POST *T ) + λ (x - x ) + (u - u )  (6)
 
Because of the highly seasonal nature of crime noted above, the equations are 
differenced across weeks of the year (hence the t-52 subscript in the differences).  The 
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key parameters of interest are the δ’s, which are the seasonally adjusted differences-in-
differences estimates of the impact of the terror attacks on police deployment and crime. 
 These reduced form equations can be combined to form a structural model 
relating crime to police deployment, from which we can identify the causal impact of 
police on crime.  The structural equation is: 
bt b(t-52) 3 3 t 3 bt b(t-52) 3 bt b(t-52) 3bt 3b(t-52)c - c = α + β POST + δ (p - p ) + λ (x - x ) + (u - u )  (7)
where the variation in police deployment induced by the terror attacks identifies the 
causal impact of police on crime.  The first stage regression is equation (5) above and so 
equation (7) is estimated by instrumental variables (IV) where the POST*TREAT 
variable is used as the instrument for the change in police deployment.  Here the 
structural parameter of interest, δ3 (the coefficient on police deployment), is equal to the 
ratio of the two reduced form coefficients, so that δ3 = δ2/δ1. 
 Finally, note that in some of the reduced form specifications that we consider 
below we split the POSTt*Tb into two distinct post 7/7 time periods so as to distinguish 
the “post-policy” period after the end of Operation Theseus. This term is added in order 
to directly to test for any persistent effect of the police deployment, and importantly to 
explicitly focus upon the second ‘experiment’ when police levels fell sharply back to 
their pre-attack levels. Thus the reduced forms in (5) and (6) now become: 
1 2
bt b(t-52) 1 1 t 11 t b 12 t b 1 bt b(t-52) 1bt 1b(t-52)p - p = α + β POST + δ (POST *T ) + δ (POST *T ) + λ (x - x ) + (u - u )  
 
(8) 
 
1 2
bt b(t-52) 2 2 t 21 t b 22 t b 2 bt b(t-52) 2bt 2b(t-52)c - c = α + β POST + δ (POST *T ) + δ (POST *T ) + λ (x - x ) + (u - u ) (9)
 
In these specifications POSTt1 represents the six-week policy period immediately 
after the July 7th attack when the police deployment was in operation while POSTt2 
covers the time period subsequent to the deployment until the end of the year (that is, 
from the 19th of August 2005 until December 31st 2005).11 Also note that a test of δ11 = 
δ12 (in the police equation, (8)) or δ21 = δ22 (in the crime equation, (9)) amounts to a test 
of temporal variations in the initial six week period directly after July 7th as compared to 
the remainder of the year. 
                                                 
11 As we discuss later police deployment levels in London boroughs were returned to their pre-attack 
baselines after the end of Operation Theseus.   
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Basic Differences-in-Differences Estimates 
Table 4 provides the basic reduced form OLS and structural IV results for the 
models outlined in equations (5)-(9). For comparative purposes, we specify three 
T*Post-Attack terms to evaluate the interaction term. Specifically, in columns (1) and 
(5) we include an interaction term that uses the full period from July 7th 2005 to 
December 31st 2005 to measure the post-attack period. The adjacent columns (i.e. (2)-(4) 
and (6)-(8)) then split this period in two with one interaction term for the six-week 
Operation Theseus period (denoted T*Post-Attack1) and another for the remaining part 
of the year (T*Post-Attack2). The second term is therefore useful for detecting any 
persistent effects of the police deployment or indeed any long-term trends in the 
treatment group. 
The findings from the unconditional DiD estimates reported earlier are 
confirmed in the basic models in Table 4. The estimated coefficient on T*Post-Attack1 
in the reduced form police equation shows a 34.1% increase in police deployment 
during Operation Theseus, and there is no evidence that this persists for the rest of the 
year (i.e. the T*Post-Attack2 coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero). For 
the crime rate reduced form there is an 11.1% fall during the six-week policy-on period 
with minimal evidence of either persistence or a treatment group trend in the estimates 
for the  T*Post-Attack2 variable.12 Despite this we include a full set of 32 borough-
specific trends in the specifications in columns (7) and (8) to test robustness. The crime 
rate coefficient for the Operation Theseus period halves but the interaction term is still 
significant indicating that there was a fall in crime during this period that was over and 
above that of any combination of trends. 
The coincident nature of the respective timings of the increase in police 
deployment and the fall in crime suggests that the increased security presence lowered 
crime.  The final three columns of the Table therefore show estimates of the causal 
impact of increased deployment on crime.  Column (11) shows the basic IV estimate 
where the post-attack effects are constrained to be time invariant.  Columns (12) and 
                                                 
12  Whilst we have seasonally differenced the data one may have concerns about possible contamination 
from further serial correlation.  We follow Bertrand et al (2004) and collapse the data before and after the 
attacks and get extremely similar results:  the estimate (standard error) based on collapsed data 
comparable to the T*Post-Attack 1 estimate in column (6) of Table 2 was -.112 (.027). 
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(13) allow for time variation to identify a more local causal impact.  The Instrumental 
Variable estimates are precisely determined owing to the strength of the first stage 
regressions in the earlier columns of the Table.  The preferred estimate with time-
varying terror attack effects (reported in column (12)) shows an elasticity of crime with 
respect to police of around -.32.  This implies that a 10 percent increase in police activity 
reduces crime by around 3.2 percent.  
The magnitudes of these causal estimates are similar to the small number of 
causal estimates found in the literature (they are also estimated much more precisely in 
statistical terms because of the very sharp discontinuity in police deployment that 
occurred).  Levitt’s (1997) study found elasticities in the -0.43 to -0.50 range, while 
Corman and Mocan (2000) estimated an average elasticity of -0.45 across different types 
of offences. 
OLS estimates are reported in columns (9) and (10) for comparison. The column 
labelled ‘levels’ estimates a pooled cross-sectional regression resulting in a high, 
positive coefficient on the police deployment variable. In column (10) we estimate a 
seasonally-differenced version of this OLS regression getting a negligible, insignificant 
coefficient. This reflects the fact there is limited year-on-year change in police hours to 
be found when the seasonal difference is taken.  
Different Crime Types 
So far the results we have considered use a measure of total crimes. However, 
the potential heterogeneity of the overall effect by the type of crime is clearly important 
to the experiment considered here. The pattern of the impact by crime type is an 
important falsification exercise. The main feature of Operation Theseus was a highly 
visible public deployment of police officers in the form of foot and mobile patrols, 
particularly around major transport hubs. We could therefore expect any police effect to 
be operating mainly through a deterrence technology, that is an increase in the 
probability of detection for crimes committed in or around public places. As a result, the 
crime effect documented in Tables 3 and 4 should be concentrated in crimes types 
susceptible to this type of technology.   
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In Table 5 we estimate the reduced form treatment effect across the 6 major 
categories defined by the Metropolitian Police – thefts, violent crimes, sexual offences, 
robbery, burglary and criminal damage  This Table shows a clear dividing line in the 
incidence of crime effects by type. Strongly significant effects are found for thefts and 
violent crimes which are comprised of crimes such as street-level thefts (picking 
pockets, snatches, thefts from stores, motor vehicle-related theft and tampering) as well 
as street-level violence (common assault, harassment, aggravated bodily harm). Also of 
note is the lack of any effect for burglary. As a group of crimes that mainly occurs at 
night and in private dwellings this is arguably the crime category that is least susceptible 
to a public deterrence technology. In Table 6 we therefore divide these major categories 
into a group of crimes potentially susceptible to Operation Theseus (thefts, violent 
crimes and robberies) and a group of remaining non-susceptible crimes (burglary, 
criminal damage and sexual offences). The point estimate for our preferred susceptible 
crimes estimate is -0.131 (column 3, panel (I)) which compares to an estimate of -0.109 
for total crimes in column (7) of Table 4, and a much smaller (in absolute terms) and 
statistically insignificant estimate of -0.033 for non-susceptible crimes (column (3), 
panel (II)). We therefore use this susceptible crimes classification as the main outcome 
variable in the remainder of our analysis.       
Timing 
The previous section cited the volatility of the crime rates and timing in general 
as an important issue. Given that we are using weekly data there is a need to investigate 
to what extent short-term variations could be driving the results for our inferred policy 
intervention. To test this we take the extreme approach of testing every week for 
hypothetical or “placebo” policy effects. Specifically, we estimate the reduced form 
models outlined in equations (5) and (6) defining a single week-treatment group 
interaction term for each of the 52 weeks in our data. We then run 52 regressions each 
featuring a different week*Tb interaction and plot the estimated coefficient and 
confidence intervals. The major advantage of this is that it extracts all the variation and 
volatility from the data in a way that reveals the implications for our main DiD 
estimates. Practically, this exercise is therefore able to test whether our 6-week 
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Operation Theseus effect is merely a product of time-series volatility or variation that is 
equally likely to occur in other sub-periods.     
We plot the coefficients and confidence intervals for all 52 weeks in Figure 4. 
Figure 4(a) shows the results for police hours repeating the clear pattern seen in Figure 
3(a) of the police deployment policy being switched on and off. (Note that precisely 
estimated treatment effects in this graph are characterized by confidence intervals that 
do not overlap the zero line). The analogous result for the susceptible crime rate is then 
shown in Figure 4(b). The falls in crime are less dramatic than the increases in police 
hours but the two clearly coincide in timing.  Here it is interesting to note that the 
pattern of six consecutive weeks of significant, negative treatment effects in the crime 
rate is not repeated in any other period of the data except Operation Theseus. This is 
impressive as it shows that the effect of the policy intervention can be seen poking 
through the noise and volatility of the weekly data.   
Figure 5 then provides a similar plot for six-week placebo policy periods. That 
is, we define a set of hypothetical placebo policy periods each lasting six weeks and 
include the associated interaction terms in our baseline regression for susceptible crimes, 
plotting the coefficients and confidence intervals for each of these “policy on” periods.13 
The results in Figure 5 highlight the distinctiveness of the policy effect in the Operation 
Theseus period, which is the only effect significant at the 1% level.  Obviously, this 
extra precision is the result of the six consecutive weekly effects seen in the previous 
graph.    
As a further check on the issue of volatility we also make use of some monthly, 
borough-level crime data available from 2001 onwards.14 These data allow us to 
examine whether there is a regular pattern of negative effects in the middle part of the 
year. Results using this data are reported in Table 7. Here we estimate year-on-year, 
seasonally differenced models for each pair of years going back to 2001-2002. Again we 
find that a significant treatment effect in susceptible crimes is only evident for the 2004-
                                                 
13 Note that the two placebo periods at either end of our sample run for less than six weeks. The first 
placebo period in the year has a duration of three weeks while the final period lasts for only one week.  
14 Note that the daily crime data we use to construct our weekly panel is only available since the beginning 
of 2004. 
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2005 time period. This gives us further confidence that our estimate for this year is a 
unique event that cannot be likened to arbitrary fluctuations in previous years.  
Correlated Shocks 
The discussion of timing has a direct bearing on the issue of correlated shocks 
outlined in Section 2. In particular, it is important to examine the extent to which any 
shifts in correlated observables do or do not coincide in timing with the fall in crime. 
The major observable variable we consider here concerns transport decisions and we 
study this using data on tube journeys obtained from Transport for London. This records 
journey patterns for the main method of public transport around London and therefore 
provides a good proxy for shifts in the volume of activity around the city.  We aggregate 
the journeys information to borough level and normalise it with respect to the number of 
tube stations in the borough.   
Figure 6 shows how journeys changed year-on-year terms across the treatment 
and comparison groups. There is no evidence of a discontinuity in travel patterns 
corresponding exactly to the timing of the six week period of increased police presence.  
In fact the Figure shows a smoother change in tube usage, with the number of journeys 
trending back up and returning only gradually to pre-attack levels by the end of the year, 
but with no sharp discontinuity like the police and crime series. 
Table 8 formally tests for this difference in the journeys across the treatment and 
comparison groups. It shows reduced form estimates that use tube journeys as the 
dependent variable. This specification tests to what extent the fall in tube journeys after 
the attacks followed the pattern of the police deployment. The estimates indicate that 
total journeys fell by 22% (column 2, controls) over the period of Operation Theseus. 
However, some of this fall may have been due to a diversion of commuters onto other 
modes of public transport. This is particularly plausible given that two tube lines 
running through the treatment group were effectively closed down for approximately 
four weeks after 7th July. To examine the implications of this we instead normalize 
journeys by the number of open tube stations with the results reported in panel B of the 
Table. The effect is now smaller at 13%.  Importantly, on timing, notice that the reduced 
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use of the tube persisted and carried on well after the police numbers had gone back to 
their original levels.  
This final point about the persistent effect of the terror attacks on tube-related 
travel decisions is useful for illustrating the correlated shocks issue. As Table 8 shows, 
tube travel continued to be significantly lower in the treatment group for the whole 
period until the end of 2005. For example, columns (2) and (4) show that there was a 
persistent 10.3% fall in tube travel after the police deployment was completed, which is 
approximately half of the 21% effect seen in the Operation Theseus period. If the change 
in travel patterns induced by the terrorist attacks was responsible for reducing crime then 
we would expect some part of this effect to continue after the deployment.  
At this point it is worth re-considering the week-by-week evidence presented in 
Figure 4(b). A unique feature of the Operation Theseus deployment is that it provides us 
with two discontinuities in police presence, namely the way that the deployment was 
discretely switched on and off. The first discontinuity is of course related to the initial 
attack on July 7th. Notably, along with an increased police deployment this first 
discontinuity is associated with a similarly timed shift in observable and unobservable 
factors. In particular, this first discontinuity in police deployment was also accompanied 
by a similarly acute shift in unobservable factors (that is, widespread changes in 
behaviors and attitudes towards public security risks – “panic” for shorthand). Because 
these two effects coincide exactly it is legitimate to raise the argument that the reduction 
in crime could have been partly driven by the shift in correlated unobservables.  
However, the second discontinuity provides a useful counterfactual. In this case 
the police deployment was “switched off” in an environment where unobservable factors 
were still in effect. Importantly, the Metropolitan Police never made an official public 
announcement that the police deployment was being significantly reduced. This decision 
therefore limits the scope for unobservable factors to explicitly follow or respond to the 
police deployment. It is therefore interesting to compare the treatment effect estimates 
immediately before and after the deployment was switched off in Figure 4(b). The 
estimated treatment interaction in week 85 (the last week of the police deployment) was 
-0.107 (0.043) while the same interaction in the two following weeks are estimated as 
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being -0.040 (0.061) and -0.041 (0.045). This shows that crime in the treatment group 
increased again at the exact point that the police deployment was withdrawn. 
Furthermore, this discrete shift in deployment occurred as observable and unobservable 
factors that could have affected crime were still strongly persisted (for example, recall 
the -10.3% gap in tube travel evident in Table 8 for the period after the deployment was 
withdrawn). More generally, this second discontinuity illustrates the point that any 
correlated, unobservable shocks affecting crime would need to be exactly and 
exquisitely timed to account for the drop in crime that occurred during Operation 
Theseus. Our argument then is that such timing is implausible given the decentralized 
nature of the decisions driving changes in unobservables. That is, the unobservable 
shocks are the result of individual decisions by millions of commuters and members of 
the public while Operation Theseus was a centrally determined policy with a clear “on” 
and “off” date. Indeed, the evidence on the police deployment that we show in this paper 
indicates that the Metropolitan Police’s response was quite deterministic. That is, 
deployment levels were raised in the treatment group while carefully keeping levels 
constant in the comparison group. Furthermore, police deployment levels were 
effectively restored to their pre-attack levels after Operation Theseus.15                       
Further support for the hypothesis that changing travel patterns did not match the 
timing of change in police presence is presented in Table 9. This Table uses Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) data to show that there is no evidence that the work travel decisions 
of people in Outer London and the South-East were affected by the attacks. Changes in 
the proportion of commuters before and after the attacks are negligible, lending support 
to the idea that modes of transport activity were affected rather than the volume of 
travel.  
The issue of work travel decisions also uncovers a source of variation that we are 
able to exploit for evaluating the possible effect of observable, activity-related shocks. 
Specifically, any basic model of work and non-work travel decisions predicts interesting 
variations in terms of timing. For example, we would expect that faced with the terrorist 
                                                 
15 Our discussions with MPS policy officers indicate that big changes in the relative levels of ongoing 
police deployment in different boroughs occur only rarely. Relative levels of police deployment are 
determined mainly by centralised formulas (where the main criteria are borough characteristics) with 
changes determined by a centralised committee.        
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risks associated with travel on public transport people would adjust their behaviour 
differently for non-work travel. That is, the travel decision is less elastic for the travel to 
work decision compared to that for non-work travel. We would therefore expect that 
tube journeys would fall by proportionately more on weekends (when most non-work 
travel takes place) than on weekdays. The figures in Table 10 suggest that this was the 
case with tube journeys falling by 28% on weekends as compared to 20% on weekdays. 
Thus there is an important source of intra-week variation in the shock to 
observables. If the shock to observables is driving the fall in crime then we would 
expect this to reflect a more pronounced effect of police on crime on weekends. 
Following this, Table 11 then performs the exercise of re-estimating the baseline models 
of Table 5 but excluding all observations relating to weekends.16 This results in very 
similar coefficient estimates to Table 5 and only slightly larger standard errors. 
Importantly, this means that our estimates are unaffected even when we drop the section 
of our crime data that is most vulnerable to the problem of correlated observable shocks. 
  A similar argument prevails in terms of correlated unobservable shocks. As we 
have seen from Figures 4a and 4b there is a distinctive pattern to the timing of the fall in 
crime. For unobservable shocks to be driving our results their effect would have to be 
large and exquisitely timed to perfectly match the police and crime changes. However, 
basic survey evidence on risk attitudes amongst Inner and Outer London residents, 
reported in Table 12 suggests that there is not a significant difference in the types of 
attitudes that would drive a set of significant, differential unobservable shocks across 
our treatment and control groups. Indeed, the responses given by Inner and Outer 
London residents are closely comparable.17  The attacks almost certainly had an impact 
on risk attitudes but they seem to be very similar in the treatment and control areas of 
London that we study.  From this we conclude that the effect of unobservables is likely 
to be minimal.    
 
 
                                                 
16 Recall that our crime, police and tube journeys data are available at daily level for the years 2004-2005. 
This gives us the flexibility to drop Saturday and Sunday before aggregating to a weekly frequency.  
17 Note that since the underlying micro-data for these surveys were unavailable we were not able to 
calculate standard errors for these estimates or conduct any other statistical analysis.  
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Possible Crime Displacement 
 The final empirical issue we consider is that of crime displacement.  We can only 
do this in a limited manner in that we have detailed crime data for London boroughs and 
not for areas outside.  Nonetheless, one way of thinking about displacement is by means 
of the selected set of control areas.  Suppose crime was displaced from central London 
to areas just outside, then we would see different estimated effects from considering the 
whole of outer London as a control group (as we have so far) rather than if we focus 
upon areas that do not stretch all the way to the borders of London. 
 In Table 13, we therefore consider estimates which only use boroughs which are 
geographically closer to the treatment boroughs as controls.  We consider two sets: those 
boroughs that are adjacent to the treatment boroughs and a ‘matched’ group of five 
central boroughs which, in conjunction with the five treatment boroughs, we refer to as 
the Central Ten sample.  If crime were displaced to these geographically closer boroughs 
then we would see different estimates from the baseline estimates considered earlier. In 
particular, if crime rose in these nearby boroughs as a result of displacement then we 
would expect a smaller effect in the treatment group.   
 As it turns out, using these more matched control boroughs (Adjacent and 
Central Ten) produces very similar results to the estimates based on using all outer 
London boroughs.  The estimates are shown, separately for susceptible and non-
susceptible crimes, in Table 13.  The Table gives the crime reduced forms and in each 
case the estimates are similar, identifying a crime fall of around 11-13 percent for 
susceptible crimes in central London relative to the (respective) control boroughs.  As 
with the earlier baseline results there is no impact on non-susceptible crimes.  At least 
according to this simple test, we cannot uncover evidence of important crime 
displacement effects. 
 Of course, the test in Table 13 examines the possibility of between borough 
displacement, that is, the movement of criminal activity across boroughs in response to 
the prevailing levels of police deployment. As mentioned earlier, it is possible that some 
within borough displacement occurred and that the distribution of criminal activity may 
have changed inside the treatment boroughs. This is hard to credibly test for but insofar 
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as it could be an influence it would impart a downward bias on our treatment effect 
estimates. That is, since our treatment effect estimates essentially pick up the between-
borough shift in crime they are estimates that already net out any countervailing, within-
borough changes in the treatment group boroughs.     
 Finally, the issue of temporal displacement can be best addressed by referring 
back to the week-by-week estimates of treatment effects in Figure 4(b). There is no 
evidence of a significant positive effect on crime in the periods immediately after the 
end of Operation Theseus. This would seem to run against the hypothesis of inter-
temporal substitution in criminal activity although (as with spatial displacement) the 
inherent modeling problem here is that displacement effects are diffuse by their very 
nature. Study of the displacement effects of crime (in temporal, spatial or other 
dimensions) does, however, seem to be an important research priority for the future. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we provide new, highly robust evidence on the causal impact of 
police on crime.  Our starting point is the basic insight at the centre of Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky’s (2004) paper, namely that terrorist attacks can induce exogenous 
variations in the allocation of police resources that can be used to estimate the causal 
impact of police on crime.  Using the case of the July 2005 London terror attacks, our 
paper extends this strategy in two significant ways. First, the scale of the police 
deployment we consider is much greater than the highly localized responses that have 
previously been studied. Together with the unique police hours data we use, this allows 
us to provide the first new IV-based estimates of the police-crime elasticity since Levitt 
(1997) and Corman and Mocan (2000). Furthermore, there is a novel ceteris paribus 
dimension to the London police deployment. By temporarily extending its resources 
(primarily through overtime) the police service was able to keep their force levels 
constant in the comparison group that we consider while simultaneously increasing the 
police presence in the treatment group. This provides a clean setting to test the 
relationship between crime and police. 
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 Secondly, our identification strategy explicitly deals with the problem of what 
we call “correlated shocks” to observables and unobservables. The growing economics 
of terrorism literature suggests that terrorist attacks can have a number of (mostly short-
run) economic and non-economic impacts in urban areas. In this case, we would expect 
that the July 2005 attacks affected police deployment as well as travel patterns and 
individual behaviour throughout London. Therefore, insofar as the terrorist attack 
affected these travel patterns and individual behaviours it could have shifted the supply 
of potential victims in certain areas leading to a fall in crime.  Depending on the 
distribution of these effects and the way that they are correlated with the reallocation of 
police resources this could bias estimates of the police-crime relationship and undermine 
the overall identification strategy. 
A number of features of our analysis allow us to comprehensively deal with this 
issue of correlated shocks to observables and unobservables. The payroll-based data on 
police hours that we use enables us to clearly quantify and map the post-attack police 
deployment in London.  The increase in police presence in London after the 7th July 
attacks was large, unanticipated and geographically concentrated within five central and 
inner London boroughs. Furthermore, the increase was limited to a six week period 
following the attacks, thereby creating a clear distinction between the periods when the 
deployment policy was switched on and off. This allows us to adopt a differences-in-
differences strategy to identify the impact of the police deployment on crime In short, 
because we are able to clearly identify the timing and location of the police deployment 
we are able to rule out the possibility that correlated observable and unobservable 
shocks are driving our estimates of the police-crime relationship. 
Our identification strategy delivers some striking results. There is clear evidence 
that the timing and location of falls in crime coincide with the increase in police 
deployment. Crime rates return to normal after the six week “policy-on” period, 
although there is little evidence of a compensating temporal displacement effect 
afterwards. Shocks to observable activity (as measured by tube journey data) cannot 
account for the timing of the fall and it is hard to conceive of a pattern of unobservable 
shocks that could do so.  
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As with other papers like ours that adopt a ‘quasi-experimental’ approach, one 
might have some concerns about the study’s external validity.  However, using a very 
different approach from other papers looking at the causal impact of crime, our preferred 
IV causal estimate of the crime-police elasticity is approximately -0.32, which (in 
absolute terms) is slightly below the existing results in the literature (e.g. those of Levitt, 
1997, and Corman and Mocan, 2000), but is very much in the same ballpark as these 
other studies.  Moreover, because of the scale of the deployment change and the very 
clear coincident timing in the crime fall, this elasticity is very precisely estimated and 
supportive of the basic economic model of crime in which more police reduce criminal 
activity. 
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Figure 1: A Map of London Boroughs 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Crime Rates and Police, 42 Police Force Areas  
of England and Wales, 2005 to 2006 
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Notes: Figure shows the correlation between the log(Crime per 1000 population) and log(Police per 
1000 population) for 42 police force areas in England and Wales in 2005-06.  There are 42 areas 
because the Metropolitan and City of London police are aggregated. Total crimes are for the whole 
financial year (April 2005 to March 2006);  police numbers are measured in full-time equivalents in 
September 2005. 
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Figure 3: Police Deployment and Crime Graphs 2004-2005,  
Treatment versus Comparison Groups. 
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 (b) Total Crimes – Crimes/Population  
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Figure 4: Week-by-Week Policy Effects, 
Borough Level Models, 2004-2005. 
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 (b) Susceptible Crimes - ln(Crimes / Population)  
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Figure 5: Six-Week Placebo Policy Effects – Susceptible Crimes 
Borough Level Models, 2004-2005. 
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Figure 6: Year-on-Year Weekly Changes in Tube Journeys, 2004-2005.    
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TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CRIME IN LONDON BY  
MAJOR CATEGORY, 2004-2005. 
 
 (1) 
% of All 
Crimes 
(2) 
Crime  
Rate 
(per 1000) 
  
(4) 
% Occurring  
in Treatment 
Group   
(5) 
Crime Rate in 
 Treatment 
Group 
(per 1000) 
(A) Susceptible Crimes     
Theft and Handling 44.0 53.1 28.0 117.0 
Violence Against the Person 22.6 27.2 17.7 38.0 
Robbery 4.6 5.5 15.5 6.7 
(B) Non-Susceptible Crimes     
Burglary 12.3 14.8 17.4 20.2 
Criminal Damage 15.5 18.7 13.6 20.0 
Sexual Offences 1.1 1.3 21.8 2.3 
Total 100.0 120.6 21.3 204.2 
Notes: All major crimes occurring in the 32 boroughs of London between 1st January 2004 and 31st December 2005. Crime rate in 
column (2) calculated as number of crimes as per 1,000 members of population. Treatment group defined as boroughs of 
Westminster, Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: POLICE PATROLS AFTER JULY 7TH, 2005. 
 
Q: Have you seen more, less or 
about the same police patrols across 
London? 
Inner 
London   
 
Outer  
London 
   
More (%) 70 62 
About the Same (%) 20 27 
Less (%) 5 3 
Don’t Know (%) 5 8 
 
Total Respondents (Number) 
 
248 
 
361 
Notes: Source is IPSOS MORI Survey. Exact wording of question: “Since the attacks in July, would you say you 
have seen more, less or about the same amount of police patrols across London?” Interviews conducted on 22-26 
September 2005. 
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TABLE 3: POLICE DEPLOYMENT AND MAJOR CRIMES,  
DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES, 2004-2005. 
 
  (A) 
Police Deployment 
(Hours worked per 1000 Population) 
(B) 
Crime Rate 
(Crimes per 1000 Population) 
   (1) 
Pre-Period 
 
(2) 
Post-Period 
(3) 
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
(4) 
Pre-Period 
 
(5) 
Post-7/11 
(6) 
 Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
 
T = 1 
 169.46 242.29 72.83 4.03 3.59 -0.44 
 
T = 0 
 82.77 84.95 2.18 1.99 1.97 -0.020 
 
Differences-in-
Differences (Levels) 
 
Differences-in-
Differences (Logs) 
   
 
      70.65*** 
(5.28) 
 
    0.346*** 
(0.028) 
  
 
     -0.42*** 
(0.11) 
 
     -0.111*** 
(0.027) 
Notes:  Post-period defined as the 6 weeks following 7/7/2005. Pre-period defined as the six weeks following 8/7/2004. Weeks defined in a Thursday-
Wednesday interval throughout to ensure a clean pre and post split in the 2005 attack weeks. Treatment group (T = 1) defined as boroughs of 
Westminster, Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. Comparison group (T = 0 ) defined as other boroughs of London.  Police 
deployment defined as total weekly hours worked by police staff at borough-level.  
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TABLE 4: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE REGRESSION ESTIMATES, POLICE DEPLOYMENT AND TOTAL CRIMES, 2004-2005. 
  
 
(A) 
Police Deployment 
(Hours Worked per 1000 Population) 
 (B) 
Total Crimes 
(Crimes per 1000 Population) 
(C) 
OLS 
 
(D) 
IV Estimates 
 
 Full Split +Controls +Trends Full Split +Controls +Trends Levels Differences Full  Split +Trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
T*Post-Attack 0.081***    -0.052**         
 (0.010)    (0.021)         
T*Post-Attack1  0.341*** 0.342*** 0.356***  -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.056*      
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)      
T*Post-Attack2  -0.001 0.001 0.014  -0.033 -0.031 0.024    -0.031 0.026 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.016)  (0.027) (0.028) (0.054)    (0.029) (0.054) 
ln(Police Hours)         0.785***     
         (0.053)     
∆ln(Police Hours)          -0.031 -0.641** -0.320*** -0.158* 
                    (0.051) (0.301) (0.092) (0.089) 
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Number of 
Boroughs 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32  
Number of 
Observations 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664 3328 1664 1664 1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include week fixed effects.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Boroughs weighted by population. Post-period for baseline models (1) and (5) defined as all weeks after 
7/7/2005 until 31/12/2005 attack inclusive. Weeks defined in a Thursday-Wednesday interval throughout to ensure a clean pre and post split in the attack weeks. T*Post-Attack is then defined as interaction 
of treatment group with a dummy variable for the post-period. T*Post-Attack1 is defined as interaction of treatment group with a deployment “policy” dummy for weeks 1-6 following the July 7th 2005 
attack. T*Post-Attack2 is defined as treatment group interaction for all weeks subsequent to the main Operation Theseus deployment. Treatment group defined as boroughs of Westminster, Camden, 
Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. Police deployment defined as total weekly hours worked by all police staff at borough-level. Controls based on Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 
data and include: borough unemployment rate, employment rate,  males under 25 as proportion of population,  and whites as proportion of population (following QLFS ethnic definitions).  
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TABLE 5: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF CRIMES 
 
PANEL A  THEFTS, VIOLENCE AND SEX CRIMES 
Crime Category   Thefts   Violence   Sex Crimes 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
T*Post-Attack1  -0.139*** -0.082*  -0.124*** -0.108***  -0.078 -0.089 
  (0.044) (0.045)  (0.043) (0.034)  (0.124) (0.139) 
T*Post-Attack2  -0.017 0.044  -0.054 -0.038  -0.080 -0.090 
  (0.039) (0.085)  (0.032) (0.056)  (0.082) (0.086) 
Trends  No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Boroughs  32 32  32 32  32 32 
Number of 
Observations  1664 1664  1664 1664  1664 1664 
PANEL B  ROBBERY, BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL DAMAGE 
Category  Robbery  Burglary  Criminal Damage 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
T*Post-Attack1  -0.132 -0.013  -0.035 -0.029  -0.047 -0.005 
  (0.119) (0.130)  (0.057) (0.067)  (0.052) (0.041) 
T*Post-Attack2  -0.090 0.023  -0.093 -0.078  -0.018 0.020 
  (0.098) (0.149)  (0.059) (0.075)  (0.043) (0.057) 
Trends  No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of Boroughs  32 32  32 32  32 32 
Number of 
Observations  1664 1664  1664 1664  1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include week fixed effects. Standard clustered by borough in parentheses. Boroughs weighted 
by population. T*Post-Attack1 and T*Attack2 defined as per Table 4. Treatment group also defined as per Table 4. List 
of minor crime categories per major category is given in Table A1.   
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TABLE 6: SUSCEPTIBLE CRIME VERSUS NON-SUSCEPTIBLE CRIMES, 2004-2005. 
 
(I)  SUSCEPTIBLE  CRIMES          
  
(A) 
Reduced Forms  
(B) 
OLS  
(C) 
IV Estimates 
  Full Split +Controls +Trends  Levels Differences  Full Split +Trends 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
T*Post-Attack  -0.056**           
  (0.023)           
T*Post-Attack1   -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.067*        
   (0.031) (0.031) (0.035)        
T*Post-Attack2   -0.033 -0.033 0.033      -0.032 0.036 
   (0.030) (0.030) (0.063)      (0.030) (0.063) 
ln(Police Hours)       0.952***      
       (0.056)      
∆ln(Police Hours)        -0.019  -0.694** -0.386*** -0.189* 
         (0.063)  (0.336) (0.105) (0.105) 
             
Controls  No No Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Trends  No No No Yes  No Yes  No  No Yes 
Number of 
Boroughs  32 32 32 32  32 32  32 32 32 
Number of 
Observations  1664 1664 1664 1664  3328 1664  1664 1664 1664 
(II)  NON-SUSCEPTIBLE  CRIMES     
  
(A) 
Reduced Forms  
(B) 
OLS  
(C) 
IV Estimates 
   Full Split +Controls +Trends  Levels Differences  Full Split +Trends 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
             
T*Post-Attack  -0.048*           
  (0.024)           
T*Post-Attack1   -0.033 -0.023 -0.015        
   (0.026) (0.027) (0.031)        
T*Post-Attack2   -0.053 -0.043 -0.033      -0.043 -0.032 
   (0.034) (0.037) (0.045)      (0.037) (0.045) 
ln(Police Hours)       0.327***      
       (0.046)      
∆ln(Police Hours)        -0.056  -0.597* -0.068 -0.043 
         (0.094)  (0.337) (0.079) (0.088) 
             
Controls  No No Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Trends  No No No Yes  No Yes  No  No Yes 
Number of 
Boroughs  32 32 32 32  32 32  32 32 32 
Number of 
Observations  1664 1664 1664 1664  3328 1664  1664 1664 1664 
Notes: All specifications include include week fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Boroughs weighted by population. Susceptible 
Crimes defined as: Violence Against the Person; Theft and Handling; Robbery. Non-Susceptible Crimes defined as: Burglary and Criminal Damage; 
Sexual Offences.   Treatment group definitions and T*Post-Attack terms defined as per Table 4. Controls also defined as per Table 4. 
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TABLE 7: EXTENDED TIME PERIOD ANALYSIS BASED ON MONTHLY DATA, 
(BOROUGH LEVEL MODELS, DIFFERENCED ACROSS YEARS, 2001-2005) 
 
 
(A)   Change in log(Susceptible Crimes Per 1000 Population)  
 
Year on Year Changes     
(1) 
July/August 
2001 – 
July/August 
2002 
(2) 
July/August 
2002 – 
July/August 
2003 
(3) 
July/August 
2003 – 
July/August 
2004 
(4) 
July/August 
2004 – 
July/August 
2005 
     
Treatment boroughs (T) 0.030 -0.059 -0.056 -0.097 
Control boroughs (C) 0.071 -0.021 
 
-0.026 0.007 
T – C Gap -0.041 
(0.030) 
-0.038 
(0.030) 
-0.030 
(0.042) 
-0.104*** 
(0.030) 
 
(B)   Change in log(Non-Susceptible Crimes Per 1000 Population) 
 
Year on Year Changes     
(1) 
July/August 
2001 – 
July/August 
2002 
(2) 
July/August 
2002 – 
July/August 
2003 
(3) 
July/August 
2003 – 
July/August 
2004 
(4) 
July/August 
2004 – 
July/August 
2005 
     
Treatment boroughs (T) -0.025 -0.120 -0.120 -0.054 
Control boroughs (C) 0.001 -0.065 
 
-0.065 -0.005 
T – C Gap -0.026 -0.055 
(0.051) 
-0.055 
(0.051) 
-0.049 
(0.033) 
Notes: All models estimated in terms of seasonal differences (i.e. differenced relative to the same month in the 
previous year).  Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Boroughs weighted by population. Treatment group 
defined as boroughs of Westminster, Camden, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Kensington-Chelsea. “Policy-on” 
period defined as July-August. Crime defined according to Susceptible and Non-Susceptible categories given in 
Table 5. 
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TABLE 8: CHANGES IN TUBE JOURNEYS, BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 7TH  2005. 
 
 
 (A) 
log(Journeys/ Number of 
Stations) 
 (B) 
log(Journeys/ Number of Open 
Stations) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
       
T*Post-Attack1      -0.212***     -0.215***     -0.133***     -0.137*** 
  (0.015) (0.016)  (0.013) (0.016) 
T*Post-Attack2     -0.105***     -0.103***      -0.105***    -0.103*** 
  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Controls   No Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  104 104  104 104 
Notes: Borough level data collapsed by treatment and comparison group, 2 units over 52 weeks. All columns 
include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by treatment group unit in parentheses. All regressions 
weighted by treatment and comparison group populations. Panel B reports results adjusted for closed stations 
along the Piccadilly Line (Arnos Grove to Hyde Park Corner) and Hammersmith and City Line (closed from 
July 7th to August 2nd, 2005). Note that stations that intersect with other tube lines are not counted as part of 
this closure.  
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TABLE 9: WORK TRAVEL PATTERNS INTO CENTRAL LONDON,  
BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 7TH. 
 
 (1) 
Outer London 
Resident 
(2) 
 Rest of South-East 
Resident 
(A) Short-Run   
6 Week Before 
 
0.166 0.035 
6 Weeks After 
 
0.175 0.037 
Difference 0.005 
(0.022) 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
(B) Medium-Run   
12 Weeks Before 
 
0.145 0.038 
12 Weeks After 
 
0.157 0.031 
Difference 
 
0.012 
(0.021) 
 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
(C) Long-Run   
6 Months Before 
 
0.155 0.034 
6 Months After 
 
0.160 0.031 
Difference 
 
0.005 
(0.015) 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Employment Share 
 (Inner London) 
0.448 0.205 
Notes: Source is UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), 2004-2005. Standard errors 
clustered by week. Defined for all employed person aged 18-65 working in Central or 
Inner London. Column 1 defines all those residing in Outer London and working in 
Central or Inner London. Column 2 defines all those residing in the South East of 
England region and working in Central or Inner London. 
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TABLE 10: CHANGES IN TUBES JOURNEYS – 
WEEKDAYS VERSUS WEEKENDS, BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 7TH 2005. 
 
 
 (A) 
Log(Journeys/Stations) 
No Controls 
 (B) 
Log (Journeys / Stations) 
Controls 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  Weekdays Weekends  Weekdays Weekends 
       
 T*Post-Attack1      -0.196***    -0.281***      -0.197***    -0.294*** 
  (0.015) (0.028)  (0.017) (0.035) 
 T*Post-Attack2      -0.097***   -0.106***      -0.093***     -0.112*** 
  (0.008) (0.026)  (0.008) (0.024) 
       
Controls  No No  Yes Yes 
Observations  104 104  104 104 
Notes: Borough level data collapsed by treatment and comparison group and split according to weekdays and weekends, 2 
units over 52 weeks for each set of days. All columns include week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by treatment 
group unit in parentheses. All regressions weighted by treatment and comparison group populations.       
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  TABLE 11: ESTIMATED CRIME TREATMENT EFFECTS WHEN EXCLUDING WEEKENDS. 
 
  (A) 
Susceptible Crimes 
 (B) 
Non-Susceptible Crimes 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
   Reduced 
Form 
IV 
 
 Reduced 
Form 
IV 
T*Post Attack1  -0.138*** 
(0.046) 
 
  0.022 
(0.036) 
 
T*Post Attack2 
 
 -0.037 
(0.030) 
 
  -0.033 
(0.047) 
 
ln(Police 
Deployment) 
       -0.401*** 
(0.134) 
 
  0.065 
(0.105) 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
No of Boroughs  32 32  32 32 
No of 
Observations 
 
 
1664 1664  1664 1664 
 Notes: All specifications include include week fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Boroughs weighted by population. These models estimate similar models to Table 5 but using a count 
of crimes per 1000 population that excludes all crimes occurring on weekends (i.e.: using only 
Monday-Friday). Treatment groups, T*Post-Attack terms and Crime  Categories defined as in Table 5. 
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TABLE 12: SURVEY EVIDENCE ON COMMUNITY ATTITUDES, 
INNER VERSUS OUTER LONDON. 
 
 
Question & Response 
(1) 
Inner London (%) 
(2) 
Outer London(%) 
(1) As a result of the attacks have you 
considered moving to live outside London or 
not? 
  
Yes 
No 
11 
89 
11 
89 
(2) How likely do you think it is London will 
experience another attack in the near 
future? 
  
Very likely 
Somewhat likely 
Not very likely 
Not at all likely 
Don’t Know 
36 
43 
11 
4 
6 
48 
37 
8 
3 
4 
(3) As a result of the attacks, have you spent 
more or less time in Central London? 
  
More time 
Less time 
Made No Difference 
2 
19 
78 
2 
21 
76 
(4) Since the July attacks have you 
personally or friends and relatives 
experienced any hostility on the basis of 
race or religion? 
  
Yes: Verbal Abuse 
Yes: Physical Abuse 
Yes: Felt Under Suspicion or Stared At 
Yes: Generally Felt Hostility 
6 
2 
2 
2 
6 
1 
2 
2 
  Source: IPSOS MORI Survey.
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TABLE 13: ALTERNATIVE COMPARISON GROUPS AND CRIME DISPLACEMENT. 
  
(A) Susceptible Crimes    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Inner London Adjacent Central Ten 
T*Post-Attack1 -0.123** -0.129*** -0.108* 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.051) 
T*Post-Attack2 -0.042 -0.030 -0.012 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Trends No No No 
No. of Boroughs 13 13 10 
No of Observations 676 676 520 
    
(B) Non-Susceptible Crimes  (1) (2) (3) 
 Inner London Adjacent Central Ten 
 T*Post-Attack1 0.031 0.025 0.055 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) 
 T*Post-Attack2 -0.009 -0.024 -0.007 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.057) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Trends No No No 
No. of Boroughs 13 13 10 
No of Observations 676 676 520 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All specification include week fixed effects and 
time-varying controls. Inner London boroughs defined following the ONS classification as: 
Westminster, Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Tower Hamlets (Treatment Group) and 
Hackney, Hammersmith & Fulham, Haringey, Wandsworth, Lambeth, Lewisham, Southwark and 
Newham (Comparison Group). Adjacent boroughs defined as: Brent, Hackney, Hammersmith & 
Fulham, Lambeth, Newham, Southwark and Wandsworth.  Central Ten boroughs defined as: 
Westminster, Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Tower Hamlets (Treatment Group) and 
Brent, Hackney, Hammersmith & Fulham, Lambeth and Southwark. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: LIST OF MINOR CRIMES BY MAJOR CATEGORY, 2004-2005. 
 
Major Category 
 
Minor Category As Proportion of Major 
Category Crimes (%) 
Violence and 
Sexual Crimes 
 
 
Common Assault 
Harassment 
Aggravated Bodily Harm (ABH) 
Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) 
Murder 
Offensive Weapon 
Other Violence 
Rape 
Other Sexual 
30.1 
20.4 
32.9 
2.6 
0.1 
3.8 
5.5 
1.1 
3.6 
 
Theft and 
Handling 
 
 
Picking Pockets  
Snatches 
Theft from Shops 
Theft / Taking of Pedal Cycles 
Theft / Taking of Motor Vehicles 
Motor Vehicle Interference and 
Tampering 
Theft from Motor Vehicles 
Other Theft 
Handling Stolen Goods 
5.2 
3.9 
10.4 
5.2 
12.6 
 
0.8 
23.7 
37.6 
0.6 
 
Robbery Business Property 
Personal Property 
 
6.4 
93.6 
Burglary Burglary in a Dwelling 
Burglary in Other Buildings 
 
62.9 
37.1 
Criminal Damage 
 
Criminal Damage to Motor 
Vehicles 
Criminal Damage to a Dwelling 
Criminal Damage to Other 
Buildings 
Other Criminal Damage 
 
44.3 
28.7 
 
14.0 
13.0 
Source: London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), Ward-level, daily crime
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